Nov 25, The problem of self-knowledge is one of the most fascinating in all of In this outstanding introduction Brie Gertler assesses the leading. Self-Knowledge has 14 ratings and 3 reviews. Sara said: A good intro to a still very new subject but the author was really very biased in her analysis of. Feb 7, In philosophy, “self-knowledge” standardly refers to knowledge of one’s . in direct introspective apprehension of a sensation (Gertler ;.
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Suki Bapswent is currently reading it Nov 17, Hence, Kate has a false belief about her own attitude. How plausible are these transparency accounts?
Knowledge of the External World. How do you know your own thoughts and feelings? Within the class of transparency accounts, there are profoundly differing views about how self-knowledge is achieved and its epistemic status. Cristina Borgoni – – Dialectica 69 1: Wilson now acknowledges this limitation.
Inner sense accounts imply that self-blindness is possible, Shoemaker thinks, because they regard the capacity for self-knowledge as on a par with sensory capacities like vision, and hence as a capacity that a rational person might lack. The only part that did not live up to this level was the historical introduction.
Abstract How does one know one’s own beliefs, intentions, and other attitudes? Some theorists who take this line maintain that there is a causal gap between a perceptual state and its object, and this gap introduces sources of error that are absent in direct introspective apprehension of a sensation Gertler ; Horgan ; Siewert But many of our attitudes are insensitive to reasons.
Many responses to this question are broadly empiricist, in that they take self-knowledge to be epistemically based in empirical justification or warrant.
Brandon Rickabaugh rated it really liked it Mar 04, GertleeMalden, MA: The agentialist contends that, whereas we know our itches and tickles only by observation, we can know our beliefs and intentions non-observationally, insofar as they are exercises of rational agency. This response dovetails with acquaintance accounts. Knoeledge argues that reasoning in accord with the doxastic schema is in a certain sense self-verifying.
So our responsibility to satisfy rational norms epistemically entitles us to those judgments about our attitudes that are crucial for satisfying those norms. Constitutivism is, on its face, a very optimistic picture of our access to our own mental states. Her style is clear and straightforward without gert,er the material. Empirical work in psychology constitutes another source selff doubt about the epistemic status of self-attributions. Similarly, Lawlor argues that reflection on reasons e.
Rationalist accounts must strike a delicate balance. Denis marked it as to-read Aug 15, In this outstanding introduction Brie Gertler assesses the le How do you know your own thoughts and feelings?
There remains sensations, emotions and appetites. Properly so, since the former are the more secure.
But particular versions of agentialism differ as to the precise link between agency and self-knowledge. Self-knowledge Brie Gertler No preview available – But the argument seems not to threaten knowledge in less marginal cases: But they maintain that the need for observation signals that the attitude is problematic.
These accounts require only that, under certain conditions, the phenomenal reality of an experience constitutes its epistemic appearance Horgan and Kriegel ; Gertler On the ISA view, interpretation is not required for such knowledge, or for knowledge of any state that can be recognized solely on the basis of raw sensory data, since sensory data are the inputs to the mindreading system.
The idea that our rationality guarantees that we grasp, or are capable of grasping, our own mental states is plausible only on a fairly demanding conception vrie what it is to be rational.
Academic Tools How to cite this entry. This book is not yet featured on Listopia. References found in this work BETA. Rather, he argues that we could not exercise the agency involved in believing unless, in believing, we already knew what we believed.
Self-Knowledge by Brie Gertler
I suspect … [that our] judgments about the world to a large extent drive our judgments about our experience. Aydede has questioned whether these background beliefs will themselves be available or justified. Robert rated it liked it Nov 07, The first-person authority view diagnoses the authority granted to self-attributions in non-epistemic terms.
It is ideally suited as a text for any advanced undergraduate course on self-knowledge, and will be widely discussed in the field. By assimilating gsrtler to perception, inner sense accounts construe mentality as epistemically continuous with the nonmental, and thus allow a single overarching epistemology to apply to both self-knowledge and knowledge of external things.
Inferential Justification and the Transparency of Belief.